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MORAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONALISM
MAIA CLARA DiAs*

T

HIS paper distinguishes between two crucial issues in the contemporary debate on nationalism: the legitimacy of partiality towards co-nationals and the right to national self-determination. I offer an
instrumentalist argument for the first issue and a perfectionist perspective
for the second issue.
I.

PARTIALITY ToWARDS Co-NATIONALS

The main distinction between nationalism supporters and radical
human rights supporters is their view on justifying the nationalists' commitment to a moral and political partiality towards individuals of the same
nation. Radical human rights supporters believe that established national
borders constrain recognition of basic human rights. On the other hand,
nationalism supporters believe in partiality toward one's co-nationals over
foreigners.
Thus, we face the first problem raised by nationalism: the issue of
partiality or of the establishment of special obligations towards co-nationals. Is it possible to legitimize partiality towards co-nationals? Is partiality
incompatible with a perspective that supports the universal character of
certain human rights? In order to answer these questions, I will first of all
take recourse to David Miller's analysis of current arguments purporting
to justify nationalist partiality. Further, I will question the plausibility of
Miller's own argument for nationalism. Finally, I will reconsider a universalist argument, namely, the pragmatic or instrumental one in favor of the
acknowledgement of special obligations owed to members of a same
nation.
In David Miller's book On Nationality,1 he offers a detailed discussion
of the concepts of nation, national identity, justifications of nationalism
and the political and ethical consequences of its acknowledgement. 2 He
states that only a particularist moral perspective can reasonably support
arguments in favor of nationalism. 3 In support of his proposition, Miller
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1. DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995).

2. See generally id.
3. See id. at 79-80 (concluding preference for particularist view).
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defines and distinguishes between the universalist and the particularist
moral perspectives as well as their respective claims in favor of
4
nationalism.
The universalist moral perspective believes that the individual is only
identified on the basis of general characteristics and capacities of human
beings. 5 Miller states, "[b]ecause the principles are to be universal in
form, only general facts about individuals can serve to determine my duties towards them." 6 Conversely, Miller defines the particularist perspective as one that considers the individual as part of complex social relations
7
and fundamental principles are directly linked to such relations.
Miller highlights the relevant distinction between the particularist
moral perspective and the universalist moral perspective-the metapsychology of the moral agent. In Miller's view, the universalist moral perspective believes that the moral agent is an unencumbered subject of
responsibilities and duties.8 By disconnecting the moral agent from the
social context where the agent's concrete beliefs and desires are formed,
the universalist perspective is unable to respond to the motivational question. Accordingly, the argument rests on a metaphysical and abstract concept of a person or rational agent.
According to Miller, only a particularist moral perspective is able to
fully acknowledge the structuring role of bonds among individuals in a
national community. 9 This is because the particularist moral perspective
conceives of communitarian links not merely as a matter of individual
choices, but as a constitutive part of the moral agent his/herself. By directly deriving the obligations of the moral agent from his communitarian
bonds, the particularist approach would be able to close any gap between
moral obligations and moral motivation.
The metapsychology presupposed here does not conceive of the individual as a source of selfish interests that should be sacrificed for the
moral conduct to be possible. Following the model of the obligations that
we assume in our family and friendship relations, the duties towards the

members of our national community would be inherent to the establishment of such communal relations. To fulfill these obligations is a way of

self-fulfillment. It is necessary to reinforce our constitutive bonds and the
way we want to be recognized.
4. See id. at 65-80 (explaining distinction between particularist and universalist
view).
5. See id. at 50.
6. Id.
7. See id. (" [R] elations between persons are part of the basic subject-matter of
ethics, so that fundamental principles may be attached directly to those
relations.").
8. See id. at 57 (stating basis of universalist view).
9. See id. at 65-73 (stating how particularist perspective acknowledges role of
bonds between individuals in distinct communities).
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Looking at the above analysis between the particularist and universalmoral
perspective, it is evident that Miller's critique of the universalist
ist
moral perspective, an attempt tojustify the partiality towards co-nationals,
is directly derived from his interpretation of the metapsychology of the
moral agent presupposed by the universalist. Is the universalist, however,
really committed to such metapsychology? In addition, if we start from
Miller's preferred metapsychology, could not we reach different
conclusions?
When invoked by universalists, the atemporal, unencumbered moral
agent, whose desires are devoid of any social content, has never been more
than a useful methodological caricature in an attempt tojustify and better
implement certain values cherished by virtually everyone-values such as
respect for human beings and moral equality. What is intended by universalists, such as Kant, Rawls, Habermas, Tugendhat, Scanlon, Dworkin and
others, is to assure, through certain procedures, that all individuals have
their most basic needs met. Thus, they believe that an individual should
be respected and recognized as a moral person, irrespective of the group
to which he or she belongs. To be sure, universalists sometimes went beyond these rather modest methodological concerns. The metaphysics implied in the attempts to give moral principles an absolute, not merely
methodological, foundation can be attributed to the traditional philosophers' arrogance and their speculative vices. This made them claim more
about human nature than they are really able to do. Therefore, they assigned to reason everything that we, living in secularized societies, cannot
attribute anymore to a provident God. If someone really does defend the
abstract metapsychology characterized by Miller, then Miller's critique of
universalism is well placed. For the target of Miller's critique would be a
solipsist, a bad observer of human experiences or maybe someone who
still believes that Descartes' isolation and introspection is the best guide to
human experiences.
Whether we are universalists or particularists, there are certain premises we should accept in advance. First, human beings must establish communitarian bonds, must belong to groups and must be recognized as full
members by other members of the group. It does not matter the size of
the groups-or how tight the bonds are. Second, by establishing such
bonds we feel naturally justified when adopting a partial attitude towards
those with whom we have special relationships. Whoever intends to dedicate to their friends the same attention that is owed to strangers will probably lose their friends. In general, a mother who is interested in the wellbeing of her children as much as in the well-being of humanity is considered a cold, irresponsible person. Our feelings, as well as our availability,
are naturally finite. It would be implausible to deny that our concrete
relationships with other people fix not only our attitudes, but also what we
understand as right or wrong. It is reasonable to admit that there are
different spheres of obligations and that, with different interpretations,
morality goes through them. It would be absurd and naive to think that
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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universalists and defenders of human rights do not recognize the existence of special obligations and responsibilities between a mother and her
children. Equally, it would be absurd to assume that particularists are unable to acknowledge an unacceptable level of privation for all human beings, irrespective of their social origins.
Miller's contention is that only against the background of an understanding of the moral agent, which differs from the one he imputes to the
universalist, is it possible to see the relevance of national identity and its
ensuing partiality. 10
It is not difficult to accept this contention because the alternative (the
metapsychology of the unencumbered self) seems to be quite indefensible. The relevant issue now is whether Miller's preferred metapsychology is sufficient to justify nationalist partiality. To address this issue, I will
introduce the multiculturalist alternative and the notion of a complex
identity.1 1
Multiculturalists are hard critics of homogeneous normative patterns
and their purported impartiality and neutrality. 1 2 They insist on the recognition of differences, instead of their mere tolerance by the hegemonic
social model. 13 According to multiculturalists, nationalism might be just
14
an artifice in order to impose the supremacy of a group over the others.
Multiculturalists believe that differences in gender, race or sexual interests
would be obliterated by the imposition of an artificial identity based on
15
the ideology of the hegemonic group.
Miller critiques multiculturalism, claiming it is rooted in a false contrast between a supposed authentic group identity and an artificial national identity. 16 Miller believes that both forms of identification are
social constructions and there is no reason at all to take one as authentic
and the other as artificial.' 7 It is oft true that some members of specific
groups do not desire public recognition of the characteristics that define
the group to which they belong. An example, for Miller, would be that of
some homosexuals who think that sexual preferences should remain
private.
10. See id. at 65-73 (stating moral relevance of nationality).
11. See generallyJeff McMahan, The Limits of NationalPartiality,in THE MORALIT'OF NATIONALISM 121-23 (Robert McKim &Jeff McMahan eds., 1997) (analyzing
notion of complex identity).
12. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 131 (discussing multiculturalism and
nationalism).
13. See id. at 130-33 (noting multiculturalism's focus on recognition of
differences).

14. See id. at 132-33 (stating multiculturalist view that nationalism is method
for dominant group to oppress minority groups).
15. See id. at 133 (stating that nationalism "requires that persons transform
their sense of identity in order to assimilate").
16. See id. at 135 (arguing against false contrast between genuine or authentic

identity and manufactured or imposed identity).
17. See id. at 133 (describing distinction as false contrast).
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Miller's argument is at least partially correct. The building of an identity is always a social construction. Thus, it makes no sense to oppose artificial and natural identities. Moreover, national identity does not have to be
seen as something that obliterates and excludes the recognition of other
forms of identification. The crucial point is that there is no way to prove
that one form of identity as such is more essential than others. The metapsychology endorsed here only stresses the necessity of belonging to
groups and of being recognized by them.
From a realistic point of view, we do recognize ourselves as a bundle
of diverse identifications. With respect to myself, I am a woman, a mother,
a philosopher, a professor, a Latin American citizen and so on. All these
aspects are inseparable from the way I see myself and the way I want to be
recognized. In my daily life, these aspects make me closer to some persons
than to others-in some cases, due to circumstances only indirectly related to my choices. Other aspects of my identity make me choose which
persons live with me. Some affinities help to establish among us bonds of
friendship and solidarity. In sum, Miller's preferred metapsychology does
not permit him to favor one form of identification over the others. The
notion of a complex identity is capable to congregate all these different
aspects that link us to certain people, including the political and cultural
links that connect us with co-nationals.
Because the recognition of a complex identity does not exclude the
recognition of a national identity, now we can look for an argument to
justify partiality or the existence of special obligations specifically towards
co-nationals. The argument premised on the right metapsychologyjustifies the existence of special obligations in general. This implies that certain obligations are inherent to the establishment of special bonds with
certain persons in a community. Denying the existence of these special
obligations is tantamount to denying the way we live. There is nothing in
this view, however, that makes the links among co-nationals more deep
than other links.
Nevertheless, if the appeal to the metapsychology of the encumbered
moral agent provides an argument capable of justifying neither partiality
nor the existence of special obligations towards co-nationals, what can we
say about the universalist argument toward partiality? Let us put aside the
implausible metapsychology attributed to them and go straight to the arguments. Miller himself comments on two universalist arguments for national partiality. The first argument focuses on all human beings'
supposed needs. 18 Among these needs, we find the necessity to establish
special relationships that generate special rights and duties for the individuals involved in these relationships. By recognizing the value of these relationships, universalists accept, as justified, the rights and duties originated

18. See id. at 52 (arguing from universalist perspective).
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in such contexts. 19 Once more, we have an argument capable ofjustifying
the existence of special obligations, but not capable of justifying nationalism. Miller is right when he affirms that this way cannot guarantee the
relevance of national identification.
The second universalist argument for national partiality examines the
recognition of diversity, the extension of humans' demands and humans'
aims to optimize their satisfaction. 20 In this connection, mere physical
and/or cultural proximity would make possible the efficient satisfaction of
human demands: "insiders" are in a better position than "outsiders" to
21
identify and to provide for the needs of their communitarian fellows.
Thus, the second universalist argument would view national bonds as
means to satisfy human demands in an efficient way.
Miller critiques the second universalist argument for two reasons.
First, he states that the argument, even if it were sound, does not guarantee an intrinsic relevance to national identity. 22 Miller is quite right. But
should national identity have an intrinsic relevance? Why can we not simply suppose that to be organized in a nation is no more than a way to make
social life flourish and be more efficient? Why is Miller opposed to this
instrumental view of nationality?
Second, he denies that cultural and/or territorial proximity is in fact
an optimizer of our satisfactions. 23 We have no reason to believe that this
group could more efficiently satisfy the basic demands of individuals from
a specific group. As a general rule, it is quite so. We have only to look
around to be assured that the wealthier countries in this world are in a
much better position to meet the material needs of African communities
than the Africans themselves.
Nevertheless, the universalist argument premised on the pragmatic
value of proximity does not aim to establish absolutely general principles.
It starts from a quite trivial consideration about the importance of living
together and of cultural identity for the adequate identification of the real
needs and the appropriate means to meet them. Cultural and territorial
proximity are of course contingent aspects, but I cannot see how they cannot be pragmatically relevant.
In sum, the second universalist argument for partiality aims specifically at the recognition of national identity. National identity is viewed as
an instrument for the attaining of more general goals. Of course, national
identity becomes important only when it is seen as a good/efficient means
19. A good example, according to Miller, is the perspective defended in A.
Gewirth, Ethical Universalism and Particularism,85J. PHIL. 283 (1988). Another example that is well representative of this kind of argument is YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL
NATIONALISM (1995).

20. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 51-52 (arguing from universalist perspective).
21. See id. at 52 n.3 (mentioning Peter Singer's article, Reconsideringthe Famine
Relief Argument, as good example of argument).
22. See id. at 61-62 (rejecting second universalist argument).
23. See id. at 63 (rejecting instrumental argument).
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to achieve such goals. Miller finds this instrumental view of national identity not congenial, as it cannot accommodate any intrinsic value we might
want to attribute to national identity. 24 Nevertheless, I cannot see how any
argument for the existence of special obligations owed to co-nationals may
have a different character. As it is the case with all moral rules, such obligations are intended to promote the well-being of human beings. These
rules lose their raison-d',ftre as soon as they do not respond to such a task.
Moreover, this pragmatic or instrumentalist argument for nationalism has
the great advantage of being put aside as soon as nationalism starts assuming morally condemned forms, for instance by presenting real threats to
the well-being of other human beings.
II.

THE

RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Up to this point, I have been discussing nationalism with respect to
the issue surrounding the legitimacy of partiality towards co-nationals. I
intended to show that the best argument for the existence of special obligations that members of a nation owe to each other is the argument that
recognizes these obligations as the best way to meet some basic human
needs. I will now address another dimension of nationalism, namely, the
problem of national self-determination. Here, I argue for self-determination as a sort of craving, manifested by certain cultural communities, to
establish their own form of political representation. I will defend what we
can call patriotism, that is, the identification with a particular form of political organization, distinct from other possible forms.
Given a certain metapsychology of the moral agent, I tried to defend
the idea that the formation of our identity includes the identification with
different communal aspects, with different groups, which turns our identity to a "complex identity." In our daily life, we choose, reinforce or reject
some characteristics of our personality and we establish some strategies of
action in order to achieve our own personal fulfillment. We assume as
moral principles those strategies which we favor for reasons that we share
with others. Once the contrast between the public and the private domains fades away, we try to create adequate conditions for the flourishing
of our values. It is in this context that we have to recognize the demands
of certain national groups for a form of political representation that is able
to express their values.
It is possible that the craving for a form of political expression suitable to the values of a specific culture may be fulfilled perfectly inside multinational states. Federalism may be a good example of this possibility.
What then would be the best alternative? It will always depend on the
groups in question, on the concrete demands to be fulfilled and also on
the state of the world community. It would not be reasonable to present
one single alternative that could equally fit to Bascos, Quebecois, Palestini24. See id. at 64 (rejecting instrumental argument).
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ans, Kurds and Puerto Ricans. What is common and must be equally recognized is the will to find their own form of political expression.
A form of political expression is more than the mere warranty that
certain typical aspects of a specific culture will survive. It is the only waythat individuals feel responsible for their decisions and for the flourishing
of the State where they live. This applies to those who fight for the creation of a new State in the world community as well as those that already
have a State of their own, but such that only a minority of its citizens can
identify themselves with it. What is lacking in many countries is not nationalism, but patriotism, that is, a deep identification with the form of
political organization. This is what Habermas dubs "constitutional
patriotism."25

The political structure of a nation must be able to express the most
fundamental values of a community. It mirrors the form of representation
of different segments of society and the distribution of rights in the basic
structure of society. It establishes the legitimate mechanisms of repairing

justice, including especially those invoked after usurpation of power by
political representatives of a nation. It determines each nation's political
profile, the form as it will be recognized by other states and its relations
with other nations. A community without a political representation of its
own or with a representation that does not adequately reflect its own values is excluded from the international dialogue. The protection of its valties or the achievement of its most fundamental goals will depend on the
benevolent, paternal or "humanitarian" attitudes of other states.
If we acknowledge the existence of interests still more general, we
should recognize as well the necessity of a wider forum of discussion. In
this case, the right of self-determination must be understood as the right
to mechanisms of legitimate participation in the international forum-not
as the right to avoid international resolutions in the name of "national
interests." The autonomy of each state is not a domestic issue, but something that concerns directly the relations with other autonomous nations.
The constitution of a state by a national community is a form to guarantee
its own representation, that is, to present its interests and to defend in the
international forum the common values of a particular culture. This positive aspect of national self-determination does not threaten the international forum of discussion; it only tends to make it wider and a more
authentic expression of the diversity of forms of human lives.
On the other hand, if the interpretation of nationalism presented
here does not threaten the survival of minority cultures or the possibility
of agreement among different nations, what would be the disadvantage of
such a perspective? Many would think that it does not express truthfully
nationalism itself. Why? One reason is that nationalism is often reactive,
aggressive and an exclusivist form of expression. Such reactions, however,
25. See id. at 162-63 (stating that Habermas and others use phrase "constitutional patriotism").
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are not necessary for nationalism. The fact that some people react this
way, individually or collectively, when they feel that their interests are
threatened is something that we can only lament.
Another possible reason for thinking that the proposed interpretation does not capture the spirit of nationalism would be that nationalism is
often seen as a less subtle expression of our emotional bonds on a par with
primitive tribalism. Of course, this may be how some individuals conceive
of their own nationalist feelings. Nevertheless, if we are really interested
in going beyond the more phenomenological, superficial description of
this issue, we have to consider normative arguments, not just analyze feelings. The fact that the phenomenon of nationalism is related to the expression of feelings that unite us to other people does not make it less
rational or less understandable in the light of arguments. It just means
that our considerations here rest on aspects related to the constitution of
our own identity. In other words, nationalism, as any other form of identification, includes emotional aspects that can be evaluated in light of the
beliefs and values of moral agents.
I tried to make it clear that the right to national self-determination
may be understood as a legitimate expression of the desire, inherent to
each community, to represent their own interests and values in the international forum. This way perhaps we may find what is common to Bascos,
Quebecois, Palestinians, Kurds and Puerto Ricans. How close they are to
achieving this right to self-determination and which mechanisms are more
suitable for such achievement are questions that I will leave open here.
Each case has unique history and circumstances. In that sense, each community must develop its own resources in order to constitute its own identity in the most suitable way.
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